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This thesis is a historical analysis of Department of
Defense budget trends, requests, and justifications for the
period FY52 - FY84. Changes in GNP from year to year are
compared to DOD outlay changes during this period to show
the net change in DOD budget performance with respect to the
wealth of the nation. Budget justifications are then
analyzed for select years to determine if there is a trend
in the different types of justifications advocated. This
analysis determines how the posture of defense, its
justifications, and surrounding environment are related with
respect to the relative success of the budget submission.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The evaluation of a government's budget has been a major
topic of concern that dates as far back as Plato and
Aristotle. Plato took an idealist view that "wise persons"
should be in charge of a Government because they encompass
the reasoning to best develop the "ideal state". Aristotle
took a more practical view of evaluating the advantages and
disadvantages of various types of states but still held that
governmental decision-making is best served by a legislative
body. Another political philosopher, Rousseau, recommends
that resources should be pooled together to accomplish
things for the good of the state through "general will"
[Ref. l:pp. 7-9].
These great philosophers recommend that we manage our
governments with a wise legislative body that will make
governmental decisions on expenditure of funds for the good
of all people. The Government of the United States can
loosely be described as resembling the political view of
Plato, Aristotle, and Rousseau. This budgeting concept has
endured for more than two hundred years, but not without
increasing criticism from the public due to rising budget
deficits and defense spending perceived as being out of
control [Ref. 2:p. 6].
In order for a government to function it must have money
from the people it governs. Before the people of the
government are willing to invest their money, the government
must provide a sound and reasonable plan for spending the
money: a budget. Aaron Wildavsky describes a budget as:
"a document, containing words and figures, which
proposes expenditures for certain items and purposes."
[Ref. 3:p. 1]
Wildavsky feels the budget might be conceived as intended
behavior or a prediction of how requested funds will be
spent. Generally speaking, budgeting can be described as
being concerned with the satisfation of human purposes by
use of financial resources. Therefore, budgeting may be
classified as a mechanism containing a series of goals that
have price tags attached and, when coordinated together to
achieve desired objectives, may be called a plan. Wildavsky
adds that the Federal Budget can be construed as a contract
because it "imposes a set of mutual obligations and controls
upon the contracting parties" [Ref. 3:pp. 1-5]. A 1962
George Washington University thesis provided a new term for
DOD budgeting:
"BUDGETATION ... a term that is offered for the
purposes of development as a function of imagination,
and expressed by the formula: BUDGETATION equals BUDGET
plus IMAGINATION." [Ref. 4]
The imagination part of this term describes the tools
involved in the justification of a budget before an
approving authority. Often it seems that the process of
justification is given more consideration by decision-makers
than the actual implementation of the budget.
The budget can also be described as a financial
reflection of what the government "intends to do" or perhaps
"ought to do" with the people's money. But the budget is
inextricably linked to the social, economic, and political
atmosphere present at the time of its passage and has
been referred to as the lifeblood of a government [Ref. 3:
pp. 127-144].
This thesis will attempt to analyze the Department of
Defense (DOD) budget over the past three decades. Back-
ground information will focus on the history of budgeting,
the budget process, and the various methods of measuring the
size of the public sector. Data over this 30 year period
will include a comparison of how actual Defense outlays have
changed with respect to the nation's Gross National Product
(GNP) . This will serve to reflect how socio-economic
conditions (represented by the wealth of the nation as
indicated by GNP) have influenced Defense budget outlays.
Once the data over this period is stratified into similar
groups, additional social conditions present will be
reviewed as well as the political tone used in budget
justifications by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) before
Congress. All DOD budget and GNP dollar values will be
converted to constant 1972 dollars to enhance evaluations
utilizing appropriate deflaters from the Economic Report of
the President for 1985 [Ref. 5], The objective will be to
determine how the posture of Defense, its justifications,
and surrounding environment are related with respect to the
relative success of the budget submission.
II. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF U.S. BUDGETING PROCESS
1. 1789-1910; Formative Years
The primary focus on budgeting during this period
was aimed at the legality of expenditures rather than an
adequate and understandable record of what was procured with
allotted funds [Ref. 6:p. 63]. The reason for this, as
explained by Jesse Burkhead, is that the budget system of
Great Britain was not fully developed at the time of the
American Revolution leaving the authors of the Constitution
with nothing to emulate. This, Burkhead explains, is the
reason that the Constitution was broad in its requirements
for accounting for receipts and expenditures of public funds
[Ref. 7:p. 9] when it states:
"No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular
statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of
all public money shall be published from time to time.
All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House
of Representatives . . . ." [Ref. 8]
It was not until the emergence of organized
political parties that the President's executive power was
used to influence legislation regarding the budgets of
government agencies. Many saw this enlarged role of the
President as a development overlooked by the writers of the
Constitution and felt the President's role in financial
10
affairs should be limited to one of reporting only, and that
budget proposals should originate in Congress because they
were considered a project of law [Ref. 7:pp. 9-10].
However, it was the growth of Presidential power that
expanded this legislative influence and perpetuated the
struggle that still exists between Congress and the
Executive Branch over the budget.
A historical summary of this period shows that
Congress never made effective use of reviewing actual
operations as a tool of control because it was more anxious
to control the Executive Branch's influence over the budget
process than it was in promoting system efficiency [Ref. 6:
pp. 49-50], This was a considerable influence in the
liberal federal financing during the latter part of the
Nineteenth Century due to Congress' greater concern of
controlling the method of spending rather than how much was
being spent [Ref. 7:p. 11]. Another major contributor was
the social and economic conditions prevalent during the
latter part of this period which are best described by James
Bryce:
".
. . America wastes millions annually. But her wealth
is so great, her revenue so elastic, that she is not
sensible of the loss. She has the glorious privilege of
youth, the privilege of committing errors without
suffering from their consequences." [Ref. 9:p. 184]
2. 1911 - 1985; Middle Age Crisis
A major component which led to the adoption of
budget system reforms was the business community. They
11
advocated "more business in government" because of a sharp
increase in taxes and an increased awareness of graft and
corruption which had infected the budget system during the
previous forty years [Ref. 7:p. 15]. This period breaks
down into three stages.
a. Stage One: Expenditure Control
The official kickoff for budgetary reform came
with President Taft's appointment of the Commission on
Economy and Efficiency in 1911 [Ref. 6:p. 67]. President
Taft sought to establish a national budget system to serve
as an instrument of management and control. Taft's
commission reported their results to Congress on June 27,
1912 [Ref. 7:pp. 18-19], with five proposals for reform
requirements as follows:
PROPOSAL 1. The need for a comprehensive Executive budget
that would cover both expenditures and
revenues.
PROPOSAL 2. The need for a functional categorization of
expenditures and a distinction between
capital and current outlays for the ease of
Congressional review.
PROPOSAL 3. Make provisions to provide for the program
aspect of the budget and the question of
economy and efficiency.
PROPOSAL 4. Establish vertical arrangements that will
decentralize responsibilities over various
layers to assist the effective execution of
the budget.
PROPOSAL 5. Stress a systematic review of the budget by
development of an improved accounting system
to assist evaluation of Government work.
[Ref. 6:pp. 67-72]
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These proposals were the results of questionnaires sent to
other national governments [Ref. 7:p. 19]. They resulted in
an Executive budget with the essential ingredients of a
budget process that has served as a springboard for all
budget reforms since its inception [Ref. 6:pp. 67-72].
As a result of the prestige of the Commission
and Presidential support, budgeting was made an issue of
national significance that stimulated interest in budgetary
reform and sparked voluminous writings on the subject
[Ref. 7:p. 21]. Unfortunately, legislative action on these
proposals was delayed due to the political situation in
1912. It was not until after World War I that the
Commission's efforts were placed into action under the
Budgeting and Accounting Act of 1921 [Ref. 6:pp. 67-72].
Many scholars of U.S. Government budget history
agree that a budget system was not in place until the
passing of this law in 1921:
"On June 10, 1921, Congress passed what is known as the
Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, which removed from the
government of the United States the invidious distinction
of being the only government of first rank that was
attempting to manage its financial affairs without the use
of a budget as its central instrument of financial
control." [Ref. 10:p. vii]
Besides the formation of a budget system, the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 also provided for a Bureau
of Budget (BOB) and the General Accounting Office (GAO)
.
BOB was formed to assist the President in budgetary matters
13
while GAO was assigned to Congress as an investigative
agency [Ref. 6:pp. 72-75], Since this new budget was
conceived under the premise of tax reduction, this continued
to be the theme of early budget reform.
b. Stage Two: Management Staffing
The Reorganization Act of 1939 was the direct
result of the 1937 President's Committee on Administrative
Management. This committee felt that the establishment of
an Executive Office would strengthen the management powers
of the President and provide a means of planning a complete
fiscal system. The President, Franklin D. Roosevelt,
asserted that his managerial skills were inadequate to keep
up with the growing business of government and set up the
National Resources Planning Board and the Bureau of Budget
(BOB) under his new Executive Office. The growth of the
Executive Office rapidly expanded under this new
organization as evidenced by the increase in the BOB's staff
from forty to five hundred members [Ref. 6:pp. 78-80].
While the Reorganization Act gave power to the President,
the Employment Act of 1946 gave it purpose by charging the
federal government with endeavoring to formulate economic
policies that would lead to full employment and stable
prices [Ref. ll:p. 28]. The Act also provided the President
will a small advisory staff, called the Council of Economic
Advisors, to inform him of the budget's impact on economic
14
stability. The following year, the National Security Act
increased the size and power of the Executive Office further
by establishment of a National Security Council that would
integrate domestic, foreign, and military policies [Ref, 6:
pp. 81-83].
To this point, all reform action was directed
toward the establishment of an Executive national budget and
staffing it with ample expertise to administer budget
processes properly. This philosophy was later changed due
to the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government (Hoover Commission) which focused on budget-
ing methodology rather than staffing [Ref. 7:pp. 134-135].
The Hoover Commission recommended a method of budgeting
concerned more with what the government does than with what
it buys [Ref l:p. 23] and was a major stimulus to the
adoption of a performance budget by the Federal Government
[Ref. 7:pp. 134-135]. The commission emphasized that
achievement of improved efficiency should be imposed by
departmental efforts and not from top levels [Ref. 6:pp. 85-
86]. Performance Budgeting, used extensively through the
1950's and early 1960's, had the advantage of focusing
attention on individual programs but did not tell top policy
makers anything about how effectively goals were being
accomplished [Ref. l:pp. 23-24]. Performance Budgeting is
the climax to this second stage of budget reform concerned
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with management orientation and improvement and a measure-
ment of agency budget preparation.
c. Stage Three: Budgeting Techniques
The major emphasis during Stage One- was the
development of a suitable expenditure control system. Stage
Two focused on supplying this system with an adequate
management staff that would promote system improvement and
provide a means of measurement. Stage Three seeks out the
proper approach for management to undertake in linking
planning and budgeting to the analytical criteria of welfare
economics by streamlining information gathering and decision
making [Ref. 12:p. 19].
(1 ) Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System . The system of planning, programming, and budgeting
matches up to three principles: establishing a desired
outcome (planning), the structuring of methods in which to
achieve the outcome (programming), and the available funds
in which to accomplish the outcome (budgeting). It is
predicated on the dominance of the planning function and
tries to promote effective and efficient government
operations through improvement of resource allocation among
the various competing needs [Ref. 12:pp. 15-19].
In August of 1965, President Johnson
installed the planning, programming, and budgeting system
(PPBS) for all agencies of the federal government [Ref. 13:
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p. 1], PPBS was described as a set of goals and objectives
that seeks to fulfill the following aims of Charles
Schultze, BOB Director at the time of PPBS implementation:
1. "Specification of objectives": forcing government
agencies to identify and examine the fundamental aims
of their programs
2. "Evaluation of program output as it relates to
objectives": analysis of output for a particular
program should be put in terms of its goals
3. "Measurement of total system costs": measure program
costs as forecasted over several years and not just
one
4. "Multiyear program planning": formulation and
projection of future programs expected over several
years
5. "Evaluation of alternative program designs": achieve
desired objectives through the least cost by analysis
of alternative decisions
6. "Integration of policy and program decisions with the
budgetary process": establishment of systematic
analytical procedures as an integral part of the
budget review [Ref. 13:pp. 19-23]
Implementation of PPBS offered a sensible,
long range method [Ref. 14:p. 138] of allocating scarce
resources among competing claims because it clarified the
analysis of program objectives, effectiveness, and costs
[Ref. 13:p. 23].
(2) Management by Objectives . As with its
predecessor PPBS, Management by Objectives (MBO) , was
popularized in the business community [Ref. 15:p. 101]. The
MBO process was considered a more fair and reasonable
technique of budgeting because it offered individuals an
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opportunity to increase self motivation by setting their own
objectives [Ref. 16:p. 309]. The implementation was done
more for the sake of change by President Nixon in 1973 than
anything else. The MBO purpose was to develop common
interest around policy goals of the President but it tended
to focus less on costs and more on consequences of govern-
ment actions. However, MBO never really got its feet off
the ground due to a dark shadow cast by Watergate, and like
an old soldier just faded away [Ref. 15:pp. 101-102].
(3) Zero-Base Budgeting . Zero-Base Budgeting
(ZBB) , as a means of DOD budget reform, received more media
attention than any other type of contemporary budget
technique. Its implementation, as with MBO, was due solely
to a change of political power in the White House. It
received strong support because of President Carter's
successful use of ZBB as Governor of Georgia and its
widespread use in other cities and states across America
[Ref. 15:p. 102]. Like its two predecessors, PPBS and MBO,
ZBB was also a proven success in the business community,
specifically with Texas Instruments, before being introduced
to governmental budgeting [Ref. ll:p. 272]. The purpose of
ZBB was the elimination of duplicate and unnecessary
programs by analyzing the effects of deleting current
programs and showing decision makers where utilization of
funds would be maximized.
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ZBB is implemented by dividing the
organization into "decision units" such as programs,
activities, or agencies. Next, decision unit goals are
established and decision packages developed. A decision
package equates to the decision units budget and is often
required to be submitted across several different levels as
described by Carl Grafton and Anne Permaloff:
".
. . four decision packages will be prepared ....
The first decision package (1 of 4) is be a bare bones or
minimum level budget .... The second reduced level
decision package (2 of 4) . . . might constitute an
additional 20 percent of last year's budget ....
Decision package 3 of 4 (current level) would add another
10 percent, and decision package 4 of 4 (improvement
level) might provide an additional 10 or 20 percent over
last year's expenditures." [Ref. 15:pp. 102-103]
Each decision package is then ranked based on the decision
unit supervisor's own judgement and because of the
contradiction involved, rarely does he rank any higher level
packages (such as "improvement level") above a lower level
package (such as "current level"). This aspect of ZBB
closely resembles the traditional incremental approach to
budgeting [Ref. 15:p. 103] and has caused Robert N. Anthony
to proclaim:
"To put it bluntly, the name zero-base budgeting is a
fraud." [Ref. 17:p. 344]
Advantages of ZBB are its ease of implemen-
tation into any type of organization structure and, if
working properly, its superior management information system
afforded to top level decision making. Disadvantages
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include ZBB's lack of emphasis on planning and an inordinate
amount of paper work and people needed to manage it [Ref.
15:pp. 102-104]
(4) Congressional Reform . Since the passing of
the Budgeting and Accounting Act of 1921 that placed the
budget preparation in the hands of the President, Congress'
power over the nation's financial matters has slowly eroded
while the power of the Executive Office has increased with
the growth of budget complexities. Although the original
intention of the 1921 legislation was to provide a means for
Congress to approve the budget as a whole, this centraliza-
tion never developed and the budget continued to be approved
on a piecemeal basis. Some fifty years later, Congress
found itself in the same situation as in 1921, except now
the defender of budget proposals, the Executive Office, was
armed with budgeting experts [Ref. lltpp. 153-154]. William
J. Baroody, Jr., President of the American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, summed up Congress'
dilemma this way:
"Congress may have the constitutional power to tax and
spend, but it had no orderly procedure for considering the
budget as a whole."
A reminder to Congress of this imbalance of power was the
negative influence used by Presidents such as the use of
vetoes and refusal to spend appropriated dollars by
"impoundments". During President Nixon's administration,
20
impoundments were used on almost a routine basis. The
countervailing consequence was the passing of the Budget
Impoundment and Control Act of 1974 [Ref. 18:p. xi].
Stanley E. Collender poses six problems that led to the
passing of this new legislation:
"1. Congress did not have enough time to complete work on
all budget bills before the start of the fiscal year.
"2. Congress had no ability to set spending priorities.
"3. Congress had no ability to set economic policy.
"4. Objective data on budget matters were not available to
Congress
.
"5. Congress had no way to impose spending discipline on
its committees.
"6. Congress had no procedures for overcoming presidential
impoundments." [Ref. 19:pp. 13-15]
The act established a Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) , staffed with over 200, and budget committees
in both the House and Senate to alleviate the imbalance of
power between executive and legislative branches. It forced
Congress to evaluate total receipts and expenditures and
specifically authorize budget deficits [Ref. 15:p. 105]. It
also changed the fiscal year to begin on October 1 instead
of July 1 and provided procedures with which Congress can
review and approve presidental impoundment [Ref. 19:p. 15],
(5) Incremental ism . Incremental ism is not a
technique of budgeting reform, as with PPBS, MBO, and ZBB,
but more of a theory which explains the decisions of
21
budgeting [Ref. ll:p. 15]. This is supported by the fact
that incrementalism was present during all three of the
previously mentioned budget reform techniques according to
Wildavsky and Leloup. In 1964, Wildavsky wrote:
"Federal budgeting today is incremental rather than
comprehensive, calculated in bits and pieces rather than
as a whole, and veils policy implications rather than
emphasizing them." [Ref. 3:pp. 135-136]
Later, in 1978, Leloup stated:
"For over a decade, incrementalism has dominated
conceptualization, analysis, and description of the
budgetary process." [Ref. 20:p. 64]
Incrementalism derives its name because the
budget as a whole is not considered but only the marginal
changes to an already existing base that focuses on dollars
rather than goals [Ref. ll:pp. 15-16].
B. THE BUDGET PROCESS
The passing of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974
contributed to the complexities of governmental budgeting
but did not disturb the "classical" framework in use for
some forty years. This framework of the budgeting process
consists of three parts: budget formulation, Congressional
budget review, and budget execution [Ref. 21:p. 11]. The
budget formulation responsibility was given solely to the
President under the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
[Ref. 10:p. 49]. Even though the President is given sole
responsibility for budget formulation, nearly all of the
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preparation is conducted by the Office of Management and
Budget (formerly BOB) and the departments and agencies. To
provide the President with the reconciliation of budget
conflicts, Lance T. Leloup suggests the President consider
five types of priority-level decisions: (1) total spending;
(2) total revenues and tax changes; (3) budget deficits or
surplus; (4) changes in expenditure trends; and (5) new
programs and initiatives [Ref. ll:pp. 131-134].
The formulation process begins at the agency or depart-
ment level with budget policy development designed to
achieve the policy guidance of the President. Next, agency
annual budget estimates are compiled and submitted to OMB.
After OMB review, the President reviews the budgetary
situation, makes final decisions, and transmits recommended
budget proposals to Congress [Ref. 11: Appendix A].
The Congressional Budget review process, although rela-
tively simple in design, is complex in execution [Ref. 22:
p. 3]. Collender breaks this process into four stages as
follows
:
STAGE ONE: THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET, February 1 to
March 15
STAGE TWO: THE FIRST CONCURRENT RESOLUTION, March 15 to
May 15
STAGE THREE: AUTHORIZATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS, May 15 to
September 10
STAGE FOUR: THE SECOND CONCURRENT RESOLUTION, September
10 to September 15 [Ref. 19:pp. 15-18]
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The heart of the process lies in the two concurrent budget
resolutions. This is one of the most complex processes
because each resolution contains final aggregates for total
revenues, new budget authority, outlays, budget surplus or
deficit, and public debt. In addition, claims on the budget
from appropriations, allocation of tax burdens, and entitle-
ments must be legislated into law [Ref. 22:p. 3]. Leloup
simplifies the Congressional Budget process into five
budgetary decisions of (1) establishing budget totals for
revenues, expenditures, and deficit or surplus; (2) author-
izing programs; (3) appropriating money to programs; (4)
raising revenues; and (5) oversight and review to insure
that funds are spent as intended. Table I illustrates these
five Congressional decisions and how they are categorized by
level of budgeting, key Congressional actors, types of
Congressional action, and duration of actions [Ref. 11:
pp. 155-157].
Allen Schick relates that the major problem with the
Congressional budget process is that its creation under
legislative conflict results in political compromises and
the exercise of peer pressure. Schick states:
"In Congress, the budget committees stand on level ground
with the committees subject to budgetary constraint. The
budget committees cannot issue orders binding on peer
committees, nor can they prevail when challenged by other
committees unless they have more votes than the others.
In these confrontations among peers, the outcome will
depend on the particulars of each case, the lineup of
legislative interests, and the mood within Congress. No
peer structure can long survive if one side wins or loses


























































































































































C. SIZE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Historically, governments have been criticized because
of their tendency to increase in size at proportions greater
than population growth. A German economist, Adolf Wagner,
first noted this tendency back in 1982. Wagner's
formulation of the "law of increasing state activity" still
holds true for the modern day DOD budget in the United
States [Ref. 7:pp. 38-40]. To illustrate, the population of
the U.S. has risen from approximately 151 million in 1950 to
226 million in 1980 [Ref. 23] and the DOD budget outlays
have increased from $22 billion (constant 1972 dollars) in
1980 [Ref. 24]. The DOD • s growth of 336% over this period
more than doubles the population growth rate of 151%. But
is this type of public sector measurement meaningful to most
budget analysts? No. Measuring the size of the DOD budget
can be done in many ways and one may be assured that the
politicians or journalist will use the method that best
fits their purposes. Most budget experts advocate a
conversion of all dollar figures to constant dollars and
then comparison of these values with an indicator of the
wealth of the nation such as GNP. Conversion of all dollar
amounts to constant dollars allows for the examination of
real growth by removing the effects of inflation.
Comparison of DOD budget to GNP gives the most valid
indication of the relative sizes of the private and public
sectors [Ref. ll:pp. 36-41].
26
D. BUDGET OUTLAYS AND AUTHORITY
Just as important as knowing the various methods of
measuring the DOD budget is the classification of dollar
values to be analyzed such as outlays and authority.
Budget authority consists of the permission granted to
an activity to make commitments to spend money. It is
conducted in Congress under a two step process. First, an
authorization must be passed that consists of substantive
legislation setting forth the purpose and guidelines as well
as a monetary limit in order for a program to exist. The
monetary limit is referred to as total obligational
authority (TOA), and sets a ceiling on the amount of dollars
to be spent for a particular program.
Second, an appropriation must pass that will give an
activity the right to make commitments and spend money.
Appropriations for individual programs can be passed for
dollar values up to but not exceeding TOA. Both processes,
authorization and appropriation, must have been undertaken
before a budget authority exists.
Outlays, on the other hand, are the direct result of
budget authority and represent the actual dollars spent.
However, outlays for a particular fiscal year will be the
sum of current budget authority being spent plus previous
years' budget authority. For example, FY 1985 Federal
budget authority equals $1,006.5 billion of which $747.3
27
billion will be spent in the current year while the other
$259.2 billion will be spent in future years. Outlays for
FY 1985 equal the $747.3 billion from current year budget
authority plus $178.2 billion from previous year's unspent
authority for a total of $925.5 billion. [Ref. 19:p. 6]
A key determinant in this level of outlay is the "mix"
of monies being spent or how the money was allocated over
the four major DOD appropriations of Procurement, Operations
and Maintenance, Military Personnel, and Research and
Development. Table II shows how these various types of
funds are expended over a period of time. Outlays always
lag authority and this is especially true for procurement
dollars that fund complex, long lead-time projects such




RATE OF OUTLAY PER DOLLAR OF BUDGET AUTHORITY
YEARS
CATEGORY 1 2 3 4 more than 4
1. PROCUREMENT* .14 .36 .19 .08 .22
A. SHIPBUILDING .0 3 .13 .14 .14 .55
B. AIRCRAFT .10 .40 .30 .10 .10
C. MISSILES .30 .55 .14 .01
2. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT .59 .34 .05 .01 .01
3. MILITARY PERSONNEL** .98 .02 — —
4. OPERATING COSTS .83 .14 .03 —
SOURCE: OSD COMPTROLLER
* Shipbuilding, Aircraft, and missiles averaged together equal procure-
ment total .
** Note that after two years, Military Personnel funds are 100% spent
while Shipbuilding's are only 16% spent.
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III. DATABASE
A. COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY
Budget data used in this study consists of actual
outlays for the Department of Defense (military functions
only) from fiscal years 1952 through 1984. Source of budget
figures is The Budget of the United States Government for
fiscal years 1954 through 1986 [Ref. 24]. The most accurate
account of budget outlays is contained in The Budget of the
United States Government printed two years later. For
instance, budget outlays for FY52 were taken from the FY54
printing, FY53 from the FY55, and so on. This methodology
was used consistently throughout the thirty-three fiscal
years tabulated. The reader should be aware that a fiscal
year started and ended on 1 July 19X1 and 30 June 19X2
respectively prior to the passing of the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and now starts
and ends on 1 October 19X1 and 30 September 19X2
respectively. This new fiscal cycle commenced on 1 October
1976. The period from 1 July 1976 through 30 September
1976, used as a transition quarter, is normally referred to
as FY1976T (tango). This transition period was left out of
the data presentation and analysis of this study because the
figures are relatively small, compared to FY76 or FY77, and
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have no meaning other than to distort the data if combined
with either of the FY76 or FY77 totals [Ref. 2:p. 18]. The
reader should also be aware that a given fiscal year, such
as FY19X2, begins on 1 October 19X1 (1 July 19X1 prior to
1976) and ends on 30 September 19X2 (30 June 19X2 prior to
1976) .
GNP data were obtained from the historical tables found
in the Statistical Abstract of the United States for 1985
[Ref. 23]. Table III shows actual GNP and DOD outlays, both
in current dollars, for the fiscal years 1952 through 1984.
The DOD budget outlays as a percentage of GNP are also
provided for each year in Table III. Notice that actual DOD
outlays, as a percentage of GNP, have gradually declined
over this period from a higher in 1953 of 13.2% to a low in
1978 and 1979 of 4.9%. On the average, GNP has increased by
$101.3 billion per year while DOD outlays have increased by
$5.68 billion per year giving an average DOD outlay to GNP
ratio over this period of 5.6%.
In order to look at real change, without the effects of
inflation, appropriate deflators were used from the Economic
Report of the President for 1985 to express the current
figures presented in Table III into constant 1972 dollars
[Ref. 5]. These deflators are provided in Table IV and
their results are provided in Table V in the same format as
Table III. Again, the DOD outlays, as a percentage of GNP,
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• TABLE III
GNP, DOD BUDGET OUTLAYS, AND DOD OUTLAYS
AS A PERCENT OF GNP IN CURRENT DOLLARS"
(dol lars in bi 1 li ons )


































SOURCE: DOD Data from the Budget of the United States Government
,
FY 1954 - 1986.


















1968 831.3 - 77.4
1969 910.6 77.9
1970 968.8 77.2
1971 1 ,031.5 74.5
19 72 1 ,128.8 75.2
1973 1 ,252.0 73.3
1974 1,,379.4 77.6
1975 1 ,479.9 85.0
1976 1,,640.1 88.0
1977 1 ,862.8 95.7
1978 2 ,091.3 103.0
1979 2,,357.7 115.0
1980 2 ,575.8 132.9
1981 2 ,885.9 156.1
1982 3 ,046.0 182.9
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Figures derived by multiplying deflators by 100 then dividing into
current dollar figures on previous tables.
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have declined over this period with highs and lows. The
average GNP increase per year using constant dollars is
$31.9 billion while DOD outlays increase per year is $1.0
billion for an average DOD outlay to GNP ratio over this
period of 3.1%.
The next step was to calculate the percent increase or
decrease from the previous year using the constant 1972
dollar figures of Table V. To start this calculation, GNP
and DOD outlay figures (in 1972 constant dollars) for 1951
are required to compute FY52 changes and are $547.9 billion
and $34.9 billion respectively. Annual increases or
decreases for each of the two categories are in Table VI.
In order to facilitate analysis of budget behavior as
compared to the wealth of the nation, an attempt to divide
Table VI into logical categories was made. The first
attempt was four groupings as follows:
GNP DOD OUTLAYS
GROUP 1 INCREASE INCREASE
GROUP 2 INCREASE DECREASE
GROUP 3 DECREASE INCREASE
GROUP 4 DECREASE DECREASE
It was felt that comparison of the budget justifications
between the four groups may lead to a "best course of action
to follow" given a certain trend or forecast in the economy.
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TABLE VI
PERCENT CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS YEAR



































Figures derived by taking the difference of two consecutive years
and dividing by the first year.
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In thinking about how aggressive DOD proponents may be
in the budget process, some account must be taken of DOD
trends against general trends in the economy. Look again at
the situation in 1984 (Table VI) when GNP increased at a
greater rate than DOD. Jerry McCaffery, Professor of Public
Budgeting at Naval Postgraduate School, characterized this
situation as a "window of opportunity" since society's
resources and hence, capacity to provide for defense, grew
faster than the actual growth in defense funding. External
factors drive the need to spend for DOD, but the growth in
relative wealth for spending is there. The opposite
situation occurs in 1954; here GNP decreases, but DOD
spending is decreased greater than the GNP decrease. This
is an example of "resource starvation" and, perhaps, DOD
proponents would argue that DOD spending ought to decrease
no faster than the rate of change in the economy. This
description could also be applied to 1954 when DOD declined
at a greater rate than GNP. A situation like that of 1975,
when DOD increased but GNP decreased, is described as a year
of "embarrassment of riches" by McCaffery. He says this
description is due to the fact that the DOD budget increased
over the previous year but the cost of goods and services in
the market place went down, thus DOD benefitted from its
increase plus a hidden increase resulting from the decrease
of inflation. DOD need not be so aggressive in this
37
situation. A final situation occurs in 1973 when GNP
increases while DOD decreases. McCaffery describes this
situation as one of "resource frustration" on the part of
the DOD. This frustration develops not only because the
budget was cut from the previous year but also because a
higher price had to be paid for goods and services than
previously experienced [Ref. 26].
Unfortunately, the break down of the years into the four
groups did not avail itself to analysis as 19 of 32 years
fell in the Group 1 category, 12 of 32 in Group 2, with
Groups 3 and 4 receiving one year each. This lack of equity
did, however, force a better method of tying DOD outlays to
the wealth of the nation (GNP) with results that were
equitable. Instead of comparing "gross" percentage
increases and decreases of GNP and DOD outlays, a "net"
percentage was computed by taking the difference between the
two columns of data in Table VI. The results are shown in
Table VII. The following illustrates how this calculation
was made for five years of interest:
YEAR GNP % CHG DOD % CHG NET % CHG
1953 4.9 20. 2 15.3
1954 (0.4) (16.2) (15.3)
1973 4.9 (7.8) 12.7
1975 (1.8) 0.2 2.0
1984 7.2 3.8 (3.4)
38
Notice that in years when GNP increases, such as 1953, 1973,
and 1984, the DOD change is adjusted down and when GNP
decreases, such as 1954 and 1975, DOD change ~is adjusted up.
It is felt that this gives a better indication of how DOD
outlays fared with respect to the wealth of the nation. In
John Anderson's thesis [Ref. 2], which this study closely
resembles, 1984 is categorized as a year in which funds were
"abundant" because of the percentage increase of DOD outlays
over the previous year. However, as shown above, 1984 is a
year in which funds decreased relative to the increased
wealth of the nation. It is for this and other reasons that
the data presented in this study will differ from the
Anderson thesis. The remainder of this study will be
devoted to select years, using Table VII, to determine if
statements and testimony by the President and Secretary of
Defense before Congress, have a bearing on the outcomes of
DOD outlays.
Although Anderson referred to his data as DOD outlays,
the budget figures used in his thesis were actually budget
authority figures. The difference between outlays and
authority was discussed earlier in Chapter II. It is
agreed; however, that the data presented in this study would
have led Anderson to draw the same basic conclusions
regarding the four major appropriations of the DOD on which
he concentrated. These four appropriations that Anderson *
analyzed are Operation and Maintenance (0 & M) , Procurement
(PROC), Military Personnel (MP), and Research, Development,
Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E). Briefly his conclusions were
that MP was the most stable, followed by & M, and that
PROC and RDT&E were the most volatile with PROC faring
better when funds were "abundant" and RDT&E faring better
when funds were "tight" [Ref. 2:pp. 40-41].
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TABLE VII
NET PERCENT CHANGE IN DOD OUTLAYS
_._



































































Figures derived by applying the change in GNP for each
year to the change in DOO outlays.
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B. THE STUDY
This thesis is an investigation of how DOD budget
justifications varied over periods of growth, stability, and
declining years similar to John Anderson's [Ref. 2] "top,
middle, and bottom" categories. Stable changes in DOD
outlays were those that fluctuated by less than five
percent. Although this cutoff was chosen arbitrarily, it
roughly coincides with the average growth rate of GNP over
this time period of 5.4%, and it allows for an equitable
division of years among the three categories. The Growth
category (net change greater than or equal to a 5% increase)
consists of ten years (see Table VIII), the Stable category
(net change less than a 5% increase or decrease) consists of
twelve years (see Table IX), and the Declining category (net
changes less than or equal to a -5% decrease) consists of
eleven years (see Table X). Years in Tables VIII, IX, and X
are ranked in order of highest net change to lowest. A
glance at these tables tells that the greatest increase in
DOD outlays occurred in 1952 (87.4%), the greatest decrease
in 1955 (15.8%), and the year in which the least change
occurred was in 1958 (.5% decrease).-
Five years will be chosen from each category for further
analysis as follows: the five top years from the Growth
years (1952, 1967, 1953, 1956, and 1982). The five years
















































































1979, 1963, 1957, and 1975) and the five bottom years from
the declining category (1971, 1973, 1965, 1954, and 1955).
Reducing the number of years in each category in this manner
serves to eliminate any marginal years that could belong to
more than one category. For instance, 1980 and 1981 are
very close to being categorized as years of Stability as
opposed to years of Growth. Likewise, 1977 and 1978 might
be considered by some as better suited for the Declining
years category instead of Stability years. The selection of
the most representative members from each group should
remove any doubts as to their validity. Each group is well
represented with the lowest percent increase from the Growth
years at 10.2% (1982), the least stable year from the
Stability years at 2.0% (1975), and the smallest decrease
from the Declining years at 9.3% (1971).
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IV. ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It was previously mentioned in this study that a budget
is linked to the social, economic, and political atmosphere
present at the time of its passage [Ref. 3:pp. 127-144].
While this study does not attempt to prove this statement
fully, it will focus on the political influence exerted on
Congress by the administration submitting the budget. While
the full economic impact of a particular year will not be
analyzed in depth, it is felt that the adjustment of DOD
outlay changes with respect to GNP captures the trend of the
economy over this period. Social impact, at the time of
budget passage, is the hardest factor to quantify but in
many cases is the most influential. Because of this
difficulty in quantifying its results, and its controversial
nature, social impacts will only be referred to in the
broadest of terms.
The purpose of this study is to determine if there are
certain approaches to DOD budget justifications that are
more successful, or unsuccessful, than others. The idea
that fundamental changes in budget justifications, presented
to approving authorities, might influence the final outcome
is not new, but is one that is hard to prove decisively. A
given economic situation (such as The Great Depression) or a
45
major social uprising (such as the Civil Rights Movement)
can easily overcome the very best or very worst in one's
chosen words of budget defenses. Since volumes could be
written on this subject, as it relates to the thirty-three
years of data compiled, this study will limit further
analysis to those years that best represent the previously
mentioned Growth, Stability, and Declining years. These
years along with their net percentage change, are tabulated
for reference in Table XI.
This study will center on budget justification included
in the Budget Message of the President to Congress and the
Secretary of Defense' statement and testimony before the
House of Representatives' Appropriations Committee. Two
aspects will be dealt with: (1) the different types of
justifications advocated by the President and SECDEF
before the House of Representatives for their budgets, and
(2) degree of success in the House of Representatives by
these arguments. The source of information was the
President's Budget Message, taken from the Budget of the
United States Government [Ref. 24], and the record of
hearings of the House of Representatives' Appropriations
Committee. Table XII shows the results.
A. JUSTIFICATIONS
There was only one type of budget justification used in
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justification was probably used both for its importance and
its ease of use; that is, the fact that allied commitments
are documented explicitly in treaties with other nations.
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger commented on America's
burden to aid other countries as a way of life in his
statement before the House of Representatives in defending
the FY 1975 budget:
"The United States has been forced to bear a considerable
military burden since the Second World War, because of the
diminution in the power of other countries. That has
changed the character of American life to a considerable
degree. I see an alternative to that." [Ref. 27:p. 575]
The justifications of inflation, need for modernization, and
higher cost of complex weapons were each utilized in nine of
the fifteen fiscal years. Four of these were yearss of
decline while only one was a year of growth. Secretary of
Defense Wilson's comments on the FY58 budget were typical:
"Half of it due to the increasing price level and cost
level of materials, wages, and services and the other half
was the increased cost of new and more complex items."
[Ref. 28:p. 65]
Two of the justifications were used only once. Secretary of
Defense Harold Brown's use of "just a modest increase"
[Ref. 29:p. 349] contributed to keeping the FY79 budget
relatively stable with regard to the previous year. But the
notion that "quick dividends will be seen from the
increases" paid off well for Secretary of Defense Casper
Weinberger's FY82 budget. He stated:
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"Our proposed increases would significantly and quickly
strengthen our ability to respond to the Soviet threat at
all levels of conflict and in all areas of the world vital
to our national interests." [Ref. 30:p. 15_L
Retention of personnel was used in three years with no
real conclusions to be drawn other than the need for
maintaining an all-volunteer force. Secretary of Defense
Weinberger felt that retention was "the most serious single
readiness problem" in his statement to Congress on the FY
1982 budget:
"These increases will be directed to the following broad
categories. First, readiness .... Second, personnel.
The most serious single readiness problem we have today
is the shortage of experienced personnel, in particular in
the senior enlisted ranks and in certain critical job
skills both for officers and for enlisted personnel . . .
We believe that a return to pay comparability is essential
to retaining our most experienced personnel. The Reagan
budget asks for an additional $400 million in FY1981 and
$1.8 billion in FY1982 . . . ." [Ref. 30:pp. 19-20]
The most significant justification over this period seems to
be the characterization of current military strength as
being adequate or inadequate. Three of the fifteen fiscal
years analyzed characterized the current military strength,
or budget that supports it, as inadequate. All three of
these years fell into the Growth group. This single
distinction in budget justifications appears to have had the
greatest effect on the success or failure of budget passage.
This may bear more credence after evaluating the two Growth
years that were successful in spite of this justification.
The original budget proposals for FY52 and FY53 were
submitted on the basis of funds needed to sustain military
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forces during a peacetime environment with little or no
consideration to the Korean conflict. The costs of actual
military activities were submitted to Congress in the form
of supplementals as funds were required. A discussion in
the Senate Committee on Appropriations between Senator Homer
Ferguson of Michigan and Secretary of Defense Robert A.
Lovett best describes this situation:
Ferguson: "Is there anything in this budget of $57
billion plus for the battles in Korea, for the
actual Korean War?"
Lovett: "Yes, sir."
Ferguson: "How much of it?"
Lovett: "The forces stationed in Korea are provided for
here on a so-called peacetime consumption
rate."
Ferguson: "Is this peace in Korea? Is this peacetime in
Korea?"
Lovett: "No, sir; but we have no means of estimating
accurately now in advance, how many shells will
be expended, and so forth. It depends on the
rate of activity."
Ferguson: "Mr. Lovett, if we do not have a way of
estimating what we are going to need in Korea
while the war is actually going on in Korea,
how can we ever anticipate what we are going to
need in a war that has not started?"
Lovett: uWe have not anticipated needs for a war that
has not started. We are estimating on the
requirements of a minimum defense force. The
wartime expenditures would be incalculable."
Ferguson: "Why can we not get those Korean items in the
regular budget? Why do we not get them in
here?"
Lovett: "You get them in supplementals because we come
up only when we have actual provable
deficiencies." [Ref. 31:pp. 26-27]
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This approach of increasing the FY52 and FY53 budgets was
not always employed during times when actual conflicts
existed. In FY67, at the height of the Vietnam Conflict,
the consensus of both the President and the Secretary of
Defense was that increases were needed because current
military strength was not adequate. They did, however,
include in their initial budget proposal significant funding
for the Southeast Asian conflict. This question was put to
Secretary McNamara by the Chairman of the House Appropria-
tions Committee, George H. Mahon, as follows:
Mahon: "Will the estimates for fiscal year 1967
adequately fund the currently approved military
plans and programs, including those pertaining
to the war in southeast Asia, for the entire
fiscal year?"
McNamara: "No, sir." [Ref. 32:p. 71]
This premise was used as the foundation for justification of
increases over the original budget estimates and was
supported by President Johnson's budget message to Congress
that not supporting the budget would be ridiculous.
"It would be folly to present a budget . . . inadequate
. . . to sustain Vietnam forces." [Ref. 24: FY67]
In FY67, this 'less than adequate' justification was used to
obtain initial funding but again, as with FY52 and FY53,
supplementals were used to expand the budget even more. The
following excerpt from Congressional Quarterly testifies to
this :
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"In planning its fiscal year 1967 Budget, the Administra-
tion made the assumption—adopted for budgeting purposes
only— that the Viet Nam War would end concurrently with
the end of the fiscal year. With escalation of the war
. . . it soon became obvious that a supplemental
appropriation would be needed for fiscal 1967."
"Congress March 21 cleared an Administration-requested
bill (H R 7123) appropriating $12,196,520,000) to the
Defense Department to finance United States military
operations in Viet Nam through June 30, the end of the
fiscal 1967."
"It was the third consecutive year that Congress had been
called on to provide supplemental appropriations
specifically for the war effort in Southeast Asia."
[Ref. 33:pp. 209-210]
Situations of external conflicts such as FY52, FY53, and
FY67 presented administrations with easy opportunities to
ensure their defense budgets have ample funding because of
the urgency that surrounds them. This urgency, and the fact
that Americans are in actual combat situations, makes it
extremely difficult for members of Congress to deny these
requests. Many members of Congress have close ties, some
directly, with World War II and may have relatives or
friends who are directly involved with current conflicts.
Such social implications play important roles in determining
the attitudes of Congress and would be an excellent topic
for further research. However, two of the Growth years
occurred when no official police action was being pursured
by the U.S., FY56 and FY82.
When comparing FY56 and FY82 as profiled on Table XII,
there are two justifications that are common. Both used the
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justification of a 'less than adequate' military strength
combined with a need to overcome previous years of cutback.
The cutbacks of FY56 were made primarily by Congress due to
the end of the Korean hostilities. The cutbacks of FY82
were made by the previous administration. Both fiscal years
found the use of these two justifications successful and it
is felt that future use of these justifications will prove
successful also, if the situation arises. Both years used
similar tactics under similar social conditions with the
same result, success. The blame for the cutbacks was put in
diplomatic terms in both years and major concentration was
on the urgent need to build up the military to a proper
level. Secretary of Defense Weinberger's testimony best
sums up their position:
"Today, the budget is not sufficient for our strategic
needs .... It is clearly inadequate to support our
widespread commitments in peacetime." [Ref. 30:p. 15]
In summary, it should be apparent that the type of
justifications are directly related to the other
environmental factors, both social and political, that are
present at the time. Secretary Weinberger's statement above
was certainly easier for him to make given that the original
budget proposal was formulated and submitted under the
Carter Administration.
One of the more interesting years for analysis was FY65.
Only two major themes of budget justifications were used.
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In fact, the Johnson Administration was actually seeking
budget decreases in the Defense budget. The strategy was'to
prevent Congress from appropriating more funds than desired.
It is suspected that this was done so that more funds could
be utilized towards social programs in building Johnson's
Great Society. Overall, the testimony of the Secretary of
Defense McNamara before the House of Representatives
Appropriations Committee concentrated more on budget
formulation and PPBS than it did on actual substantiation.
President Johnson's Budget Message to Congress for FY65
almost depicts the current military forces as being too
strong. He states:
"We have now increased the strength of our forces so
that, faced with any threat of aggression, we can make a
response which is appropriate to the situation." [Ref. 24:
1965]
This point was driven home by Secretary of Defense McNamara:
"I do not believe any additional military power would
greatly increase our security, the security of the West
. . . . I believe our present military strength is at
about an optimum level .... I believe our military
power is substantially greater than that of the Soviet
Union as it must be, recognizing our greater commitments
and greater responsibilities worldwide." [Ref. 34:p. 41]
B. SUCCESS RATES OF BUDGET SUBMISSIONS
In order to determine the relative success of the
various types of justifications presented in Table XII, a
comparison of Defense budget dollars requested versus those
approved by the House of Representatives has been calculated
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in Table XIII. A glance at both the individual and group
percentages tells little of any significance between the
Growth and Stability years, but both of these groups fared
much better than the Declining years.
A better evaluation for grading the success of using the
"adequate military strength" versus the "inadequate military
strength" would be to group them by these two justifications
and compare their results in the aggregate. This is done in
Table XIV. Now it can be seen that the use of a justifica-
tion that characterizes the current military strength as
"inadequate" is historically more successful than claiming
otherwise. The key to this statement is "historically".
The future use of such a justification will not
significantly contribute to the success or failure of the
budget, or then again it might.
There are two many extraneous reasons for a budget to
fail or succeed. The point the reader should remember is
that budget justifications are shaped by the social,
economic, and political environments present at a particular
time. Accurately interpreting these outside factors and
"playing up" those that are in your favor and "playing down"
those that are not are essential ingredients to a successful
budget.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The DOD budget offers a wide range of areas for further
study. There are many possibilities for expanding the
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TABLE XIII
SUCCESS OF REQUESTED BUDGETS
(dollars in hundreds of thousands)
GROWTH YEARS REQUESTED HOUSE APPROVED PERCENT APPROVED
1982 200,878 197,443 98.2
1956 32,233 31,488 97.6
1953 51,391 46,207 89.9
1967 57,664 58,616 101.7
1952 57,680 56,035 97.1















19 71 68,746 66,807
1973 79,594 74,578










Compiled from appropri ate years of Congressional Quarterly Almanac
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TABLE XIV
SUCCESS OF REQUESTED BUDGETS FOR













research presented here. The three groupings of Growth,
Stable, and Declining Years could be evaluated as to the
affects of social and political implications. This could
include such factors as the civil rights movement, women's
liberation, economic recessions, and the Iranian hostage
crisis. Another possibility would be to take the present
framework of this study to determine if similar patterns of
justifications exist within the various service departments
of DOD.
A final topic for further research might be to analyze
justifications used by another agency of the Federal
Government (such as Transportation) to see how their
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